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FOREWORD
Perhaps the most serious threat to stability in East Asia is
the widespread fear that Japan will again become a military power
and threaten the interests of the other states of the region.
In this study, the author examines Japan's defense policy
and the capabilities of its Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to
determine if the fears of a remilitarized Japan have any basis in
fact. He concludes that Japanese defense policy places rigid
restraints on the SDF, and that currently there is no support for
anything but a thoroughly defensive military posture. Moreover,
the SDF lack the force projection ability to attack any of
Japan's neighbors, and could not develop the ability in less than
a decade--even if there were a political decision to do so.
Finally, the preponderance of evidence suggests that future
generations of leaders are no more likely to pursue a military
role in the region than the generation which has governed since
the end of American occupation, in 1952.
This study fulfills a requirement in SSI's research program
for 1994, Strategic Challenge During Changing Times.
The Strategic Studies Institute offers this monograph as a
contribution to the on-going dialogue on U.S. strategy in Asia
and the Pacific.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
This study examines Japan as a potential military power in
the Asia-Pacific region, and tests the view held by many in the
region that Japan could unleash its military and threaten the
security of its neighbors. The conclusion is that Japan is not
now and is not likely to become a military threat to East Asia,
or anywhere else. In the first place, U.S. policy is to remain
engaged, and retain a military presence, in the region. Most
Asian observers agree that the U.S.-Japan alliance is a guarantor
of a peaceful Japan; they worry about Japan because they
mistakenly believe that America will "withdraw," and the
alliance will lose its meaning.
Second, there is almost no support in Japan for a foreign
policy based on military force. If it had not been for U.S.
pressure after 1950, Japan probably would have only very small
Self-Defense Forces (SDF), if it maintained armed forces at all.
As it is, the SDF are under tight civilian control, and
restricted by a long series of policy and budget constraints
which make these forces the most restricted military
organizations among the world's major powers.
Third, the SDF simply do not have the capability to threaten
any nation, and could not develop one for years. Japan's defense
budget is very large, but not as large as it seems when expressed
in U.S. dollars. Moreover, Japan pays extremely high prices for
weapons and equipment, and must spend some 40 to 45 percent of
its budget on personnel related costs, an unusually high ratio.
Additionally, the most generous burden-sharing contributions of
all U.S. allies are included in the Japan Defense Agency budget.
Except for its navy, the Maritime Self-Defense Force, Japan's
armed forces are not superior to those of its neighbors, and are
probably inferior.
It would be foolish to predict the future of Japan. Evidence
available now suggests that a new generation of Japanese leaders
may pursue more active diplomatic roles for Japan, including
participation in U.N. peacekeeping activities. Unless the United
States disengages from the region and tension develops with North
Korea or China, there is little if any evidence that Japan will
revert to the use of force as an instrument of national policy.
The United States can and should help change destabilizing
perceptions about Japan in at least four ways:
• By maintaining its alliance with Japan and remaining
diplomatically, economically, and militarily engaged in Northeast
Asia.
• By being cautious about pressuring Japan to improve or
enlarge the capability of the SDF, especially in ways which might
be interpreted as offensive.

• By supporting efforts, hopefully initiated by other
Northeast Asian governments, for confidence-building and
transparency measures among the armed forces of the region.
• By supporting and participating in regional security
dialogues and new regional security frameworks, including those
initiated by others.

JAPAN'S SELF-DEFENSE FORCES:
WHAT DANGERS TO NORTHEAST ASIA?
Introduction.
Throughout the Asia-Pacific region, but most noticeably in
Korea and China, many defense intellectuals express concerns
about potential trouble if--or, sometimes, when--Japan assumes an
active, aggressive international role backed by expanded
Self-Defense Forces (SDF) with the capability to project power on
the mainland of Asia and into the waters of the South China Sea,
the Western Pacific Ocean, and the straits and channels which
connect them to the Indian Ocean.1 The mere possession of the
capability, not to mention its use or the threat to use it,
would, many say, cause Japan's neighbors to expand their armed
forces and prepare to defend themselves. At the least, there
would be troubling tensions and the diversion of assets from
economic development to defense; at the worst, there would be
instability or even war. Neither development would serve the
interests of the United States, which increasingly looks to the
region as a market for U.S. exports to stimulate U.S economic
growth and global prosperity.
Such critics and others virtually all agree that the
immediate catalyst for Japan to reverse four decades of security
policy based on the formal renunciation of the use of force could
only be the military disengagement of the United States from the
region.2 Because of the end of the cold war and a plethora of
economic and social problems at home, these critics assert that
U.S. disengagement is inevitable. While some believe that Japan
will adopt an assertive posture simply because, without U.S.
restraint, the latent militarism of the Japanese will reassert
itself, less hostile observers do not necessarily assume
aggressive Japanese intentions. The latter contend that, having
depended upon the alliance with the United States for its defense
and the security of its sea lines of communications (SLOC), Japan
will have no choice but to reconsider its military posture and
security policy when the alliance loses its credibility.3 Many
observers believe that the possibility of a rearmed Japan will
become extremely high if U.S. disengagement were coupled with a
North Korean nuclear threat, an assertive, powerfully armed
China, or some currently unforeseen but equally disturbing
development.
There is a widespread perception that the United States will
soon disengage from the region. That is probably incorrect. Both
post-cold war U.S. administrations have pledged to the contrary,
making compelling arguments why maintaining a credible military
presence and sustaining U.S. alliances--especially with Japan and
South Korea--will be in the interest of the United States for the
foreseeable future.4 Given open channels of communication and
adequate information, perceptions tend to approximate reality,5
so that in time the perceptions of East Asian policy elites about

U.S. steadfastness may change, assuming that the United States
does indeed remain engaged as its leaders (and I) say it will.
However, in the meantime, the perceptions of probable U.S.
behavior and corresponding Japanese responses, whether correct or
not, influence decisions of Asia-Pacific governments, with the
potential of undermining the stability of the region.
The purpose of this monograph is to examine Japan as a
potential military power in the Asia-Pacific region, and to
systematically test the view that Japan will unleash its military
and threaten the security of its neighbors. To do so, three major
variables will be examined, including current defense policy as
it evolved through the cold war to the fall of the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) cabinet in June 1993, the capabilities of
the SDF, and the attitudes of Japanese elites. To some degree, it
will also be necessary to examine some aspects of Japanese
politics and bureaucratic decisionmaking. The Japanese political
system may be in the midst of a fundamental transformation, the
direction and extent of which are not yet clear. It is extremely
difficult, not to say hazardous, to speculate on how these
domestic political changes will affect Japanese security policy.
Nonetheless, some discussion of the possible impact of domestic
political change is included. While the findings will not answer
all of the concerns of many defense intellectuals in the region-undoubtedly Japan's future behavior could conflict with the
interests of its neighbors--on balance the conclusions should at
least offer plausible alternatives to the hypothesis that Japan
will become a military threat in Northeast Asia. For
methodological reasons too complex and pedantic to be included in
this essay, arguments based solely on geopolitical systems
theory, such as those contained in The Coming War With Japan,6
will not be included in the analysis. Suffice it to say that I
believe that Japan's national policies are made by national
leaders, influenced but not dictated by systemic factors like
geography.7 Finally, the implications for the United States and
some recommendations for U.S. policy will be presented.
Security Policy under the Peace Constitution.
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on
Justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce
war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat
of force as a means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding
paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as war
potential, will never be maintained. The right of
belligerency of the State will not be recognized.
Article 9
Constitution of Japan
This Constitutional provision has denied Japan the authority

to use or threaten to use force as instruments of national
policy. Even though written by General MacArthur's staff and
imposed on Japan's political leaders,8 Article 9 has always had
broad popular support in Japan, and was deliberately used by the
conservative rulers of the nation to control the costs of
security while almost single-mindedly pursuing economic recovery
and development.9 In addition to this pragmatic support from
Liberal Democratic politicians, bureaucrats, and businessmen, it
has had ideological and emotional support from the Japan Social
Democratic Party (JSDP),10 many educators and journalists,
organized labor, and large segments of the public. Indeed, until
recently, just raising the issue of changing Article 9 was
unthinkable--an act of political suicide--among Japanese
politicians.
Today, few in Japan still accept Article 9 literally. The
official interpretation of the provision, reconciling its words
with the sovereign right of self-defense awarded by international
law and irresistible U.S. pressures, guides Japanese defense
policy and permits the existence of a sophisticated military
organization. But the existence of the SDF, in spite of the clear
language of Article 9, is not merely an example of the cynical
manipulation of legal norms for political expediency. Reflecting
the spirit of Article 9, the official interpretation permitting a
military organization also includes restrictions and limitations
which do not apply to the armed forces of any other major nation
in the world, and foreclose a wide range of defense policy
options.
Japan's defense policy has not only been circumscribed by
the Constitution, but by a complex of attitudes embedded in its
political culture by the trauma caused by World War II, which
reinforces the antimilitary Constitutional provisions. The
importance of that great conflict in forming Japanese political
attitudes can be better appreciated by summarizing some of its
results for Japanese society. Japan suffered a humiliating
defeat--the first ever by a foreign foe--and enormous human and
material losses. There were some 2.3 million battlefield
casualties between 1937 and the end of the war. Civilian
casualties amounted to 800,000 more, mostly because of
conventional bombing of Tokyo and almost every other city except
Kyoto.11 Thirty percent of Japanese were left homeless, and only
25 to 30 percent of prewar industrial capacity remained. These
numbers also include the results of atomic bombs dropped on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.12 Moreover, the very people who had been
described to the Japanese people as evil incarnate in wartime
propaganda occupied their land and took control of their lives.
The Japanese saw themselves, at least as much as the
non-Japanese members of the East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere, as
the great victims of the Pacific War.13 Not only had they been
punished by their conquerors, but more importantly they had been
deceived by their own arrogant military. According to one
perceptive observer, they reacted to these conditions by

internalizing a set of four "never again resolves," described
below, which no government dare cavalierly ignore.
• Never again rely on the military instrument as the
primary means to achieve desired domestic or
international goals.
• Never again have the homeland experience mass
domestic bombing.
• Never again allow military institutions or military
officers to exercise a veto on public policy or to confront
civilian politicians, bureaucrats, or business leaders with
life-threatening ultimata or political-military fait accompli.
• Never again slight the importance of superior
technology and the capacity to produce large quantities of
advanced weapons with high quality control.14
Capability for Self-Defense Only.
Article 9 and antimilitary/pacifist attitudes have resulted
in unusual, if not unique, defense policies. As expressed in
Defense of Japan 1993, the authoritative White Paper annually
issued by the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), there are two operative
principles of the "Basic Policy for National Defense,"15 plus
several others which apparently are also considered fundamental.
The first is that a military capability will be maintained at the
minimum level necessary for self-defense--and for self-defense
only. The self-defense limitation is repeatedly noted in the
White Paper and other expressions of policy, as in the
self-imposed prohibition against maintaining a capability strong
enough to threaten another nation.16 Among other things, it means
that military force cannot be exercised until there is an
"imminent and illegitimate act of aggression against Japan."17
Even then, there must be no other means to deal with the issue
which threatens imminent aggression. Finally, the SDF cannot
deploy more than the minimum force necessary to exercise the
right of self-defense. Official policy does not necessarily
proscribe every deployment outside Japan, because the
requirements of self-defense may require striking an aggressor
off-shore.
Nevertheless, the government believes that the
Constitution does not permit it to dispatch armed
forces to foreign territorial land, sea, and airspace
for the purpose of using force, because such a
deployment of forces overseas generally goes beyond the
minimum necessary for self-defense.18
The requirement that the Self-Defense Forces be maintained
only at the minimal level, and that they be structured
exclusively for a "passive defense strategy"19 sometimes leads to

apparent anomalies, because no Japanese government has advocated
a technologically inferior force and each has chosen
sophisticated weapons systems whenever possible. Many, if not
all, of them may be used for offense as well as defense. But
"exclusively" offensive weapons are not permissible. This
category has not been fully defined, but apparently includes
long-range ballistic missiles, long-range bombers, "offensive"
aircraft carriers, and weapons of mass destruction. The three
nuclear principles: Japan will not possess, produce, or allow the
introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan, constitute a "fixed
line of national policy."20

International Peace Cooperation Law.21 Legislation adopted
in 1992, after a long, agonizing, and often painful debate,
authorizing the SDF to participate in U.N.-sponsored peacekeeping
operations, did not directly violate the self-defense only
policy, although some domestic and foreign critics treated the
proposal as the first step which would inevitably conclude in the
use of the SDF for aggression overseas.22 The law did provide a
new international role for Japan and an unprecedented task for
the SDF. Three considerations about the law, which is popularly
called the PKO bill, are particularly relevant to this
discussion.
First, the Prime Ministers who attempted to guide the
measures through the Diet, Toshiki Kaifu and Kiichi Miyazawa, did
so under intense international pressure--from Washington urging
active Japanese participation in support of international
security, and from Beijing and Seoul opposing a larger
international role by Tokyo. There is little doubt that neither
leader's cabinet would have introduced a PKO measure which raised
such troubling issues for the Japanese political elite except for
sharp criticism in the United States on Japan's failure to
support DESERT SHIELD/STORM except with money. Not only was the
idea extremely unpopular with opposition parties in the Diet and
the public at large, it also had only limited support within the
LDP. On the other hand, the reactions in Beijing and Seoul (and
less frequently and fervently from other Asian capitals) provided
additional ammunition for opponents of the measure and additional
reasons for the eventual law to be extremely restrictive.
The second major consideration related to this paper is the
narrow set of restrictions placed on the SDF. Under the law, they
will never violate the basic policy of overseas deployment
because they cannot be dispatched for the purpose of using force.
Five principles concerning Japan's participation in peacekeeping
forces incorporated in the PKO bill require the following:
I. Agreement on a cease-fire shall have been reached
among the parties to the conflict.
II. The parties to the conflict, including the
territorial state(s), shall have given their consent to
deployment of the peacekeeping force and Japan's

participation in the force.
III. The peacekeeping force shall strictly maintain
impartiality, not favoring any party to the conflict.
IV. Should any of the above guideline requirements
cease to be satisfied, the Government of Japan may
withdraw its contingent.
V. Use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum
necessary too protect the personnel's lives, etc.23
In other words, the law does not authorize participation in
anything but conventional U.N. peacekeeping operations. Had it
been adopted before 1990, Japan could not have participated in
DESERT STORM. To obtain passage, the government agreed to
"freeze" the dispatch of combat (as opposed to support) forces
until 1995, when the law was to be reviewed.24
The last relevant consideration is that most of the
controversy surrounding adoption of the measure--which, to
repeat, was very intense and often emotional--seemed to dissipate
after it was finally passed. Noncombatant SDF personnel served
with the United Nations Transitional Authority for Cambodia, and
a small detachment is now in Mozambique. When police and civilian
volunteers in the Japanese detachment came under attack by the
Khmer Rouge and suffered casualties, there was an immediate
outcry in Japan, but in a short time the issue disappeared from
the headlines and public discourse. The Japanese people now
appear to reluctantly accept peacekeeping, as restricted by the
PKO bill, as a function for the SDF--part of the consensus on
security. It will probably be formally institutionalized as a
major official mission of Japan's military in amendments to the
SDF law.25 But the unwillingness of the Hosokawa cabinet and the
bureaucracy to go beyond present restrictions was underlined in
their negative reaction to a U.N. request for an infantry unit to
join peacekeepers in Bosnia-Herzegovina.26

Civilian Control of the Military. Another fundamental
principle regulating the commitment to maintain an exclusively
self-defense capability, directly related to the "never again"
resolves, is that there will be complete civilian control over
the military. The principle is probably executed in Japan more
rigorously than in any other nation--certainly more than any
other major industrial nation.27 Japan avails itself of all the
democratic instruments of control: The Prime Minister (not the
Emperor, as in pre-war Japan) is commander-in-chief; the Diet
controls the budget, size, organization, and functions of the
SDF; the Director of the JDA is always a civilian minister of
state (all ministers are required by the Constitution to be
civilians); and a Security Council is established within the
Cabinet. Moreover, the subjugation of the military is reinforced
by a number of structural and cultural considerations. For
instance, many key areas of security policy are initiated and

sometimes settled outside of the JDA by the Ministries of Foreign
Affairs (the alliance with the United States), Finance (budget),
and International Trade and Industry (procurement). The JDA is
not a ministry and JDA bureaucrats do not enjoy the status and
prestige of their counterparts in the major ministries. In a
system like Japan's where many of the most critical decisions are
reached through interagency consultations and bargaining,28 the
limited status of the Defense Agency and its people is extremely
significant. Moreover, many key JDA personnel who routinely
participate in interagency negotiations are seconded for a
limited period of time from other ministries, where their primary
loyalties are likely to remain during their sojourn with JDA.
Within the JDA, the services and military personnel are not
particularly influential. That is, civilian bureaucrats make most
decisions and submit most of the advice to political leaders. The
SDF's senior officer, the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council, is
not the official adviser to the Commander-in-Chief (the Prime
Minister), but merely to the Director General of the JDA. There
is very little joint structure, partly because of intense
interservice rivalry and partly because most politicians and
bureaucrats fear the existence of a single military structure
which might be capable of articulating the common interests of
the SDF. One of the most visible and persistent effects of the
"never again resolves" is the unwillingness of the elites to
allow an important policymaking or political role to the
uniformed military, and the low status and reputation of members
of the SDF in Japanese society. Many SDF officers believe that
they can influence decisions of the Japanese government which
effect them more easily by lobbying U.S. military counterparts,
who in turn, they hope, will lobby Japanese decisionmakers, than
by acting through their own chains of command.29
The size of the budget for JDA has also been limited by
arbitrary policy standards. For a time, there was an explicit
cabinet decree that no more than 1 percent of GNP could be spent
on defense.30 This was formally overturned in 1987, but in fact
almost all budgets since 1962 have been less than 1 percent of
GNP.31 Since Japan's economy for the last several decades (until
recently) has been robust, this limitation has not been as
significant as the other restrictions already mentioned. Funds
have been sufficient, or nearly so, to acquire the capability
which the Japanese government said it required when it adopted
the National Defense Program Outline in 1976. In a later section
of the analysis, more attention will be focused on defense
budgets in Japan.
Alliance with the United States.
The second basic operative policy is that Japan will deal
with external aggression on the basis of security arrangements
with the United States. A defense capability which could handle
any eventuality would require an "excessive economic burden" and

would be politically unwise if not unconstitutional.32 The
National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), an official document
adopted in 1976 which contains the rationale and purpose of the
SDF and sets limits on its structure,33 asserts that the
self-defense capability should be developed to repel or defeat
"small-scale" aggression--aggression that is launched without
extensive preparations which could be detected in advance. On the
other hand, the SDF need only be able to slow down large-scale
aggression until the presumably superior forces of the United
States are brought to bear. The U.S. nuclear umbrella is also a
part of the Japanese concept of defense. Openly and explicitly,
then, Japanese security against the most serious dangers is tied
to and dependent upon the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security Between Japan and the United States (hereinafter, Mutual
Security Treaty) and political decisions made in the United
States.
Unlike the North Atlantic Treaty, the agreement with Japan
is asymmetrical. That is, the U.S. commitment to come to the
defense of Japan in the event of aggression is not matched by a
Japanese commitment to come to the defense of the United States
in the case of aggression.34 Such a commitment, according to the
official interpretation of Article 9, would be an exercise of the
right of collective self-defense, which Japan as a sovereign
nation enjoys, but it would also extend beyond the minimum
required for self-defense, which is all that the Constitution
allows. Japan does agree to help defend U.S. personnel and
facilities on Japanese territory if they are attacked by an
outside aggressor (when, of course, Japan also would be under
attack), but that is all.35 Japan's direct contributions to the
military aspects of the alliance, beyond maintaining the SDF,
are limited to providing facilities for U.S. forces in Japan and
financial support for the operations of those facilities,
agreeing to attempt to develop the capability to patrol SLOC out
to 1,000 nautical miles,36 and permitting limited transfers of
military technology to the United States. The last concession, an
exception to the general rule that prohibits exporting weapons
and weapons technology,37 was only made after intense pressure
from Washington, but recently has been positively reaffirmed in
the Tokyo Declaration on the U.S.-Japan Global Partnership signed
during President Bush's Tokyo visit in 1992.38 In 1988, the two
governments agreed to the co-design and co-production of the
controversial FSX fighter, a project still incomplete, and have
initiated other less well-known cooperative undertakings.39
During the cold war, the availability of bases for U.S.
forces was of obvious value in the execution of the strategy of
containment. The projection of Soviet military force into the
Pacific was complicated, if not blocked, by the geographic
location of Japan. All Soviet, now Russian, warm-water ports in
Asia were/are accessible only through narrow straits around or
through the Japanese islands. Moreover, Soviet submarines with
ballistic missiles targeted on the United States hovered in the
Sea of Okhotsk, well-protected but clearly more easily detected

and intercepted from Japanese naval and air bases than from U.S.
territory. Japan's location also made it (and still does) a
highly desirable logistic and staging base for operations on the
Korean peninsula, should conflict reoccur there. The Mutual
Security Treaty authorizes U.S. bases in Japan not only to defend
Japan, but also for "the maintenance of international peace and
security in the Far East,"40 a euphemism for deterring or
engaging in conflict on the peninsula. The SDF itself cannot
directly participate in regional quarrels, but according to the
NDPO "the very fact that Japan firmly maintains...a defense
posture [the SDF plus the alliance] contributes as well to the
international political stability of Japan's neighboring
region,"41 while the absence of this posture might create a
vacuum which would invite aggression.42 The differences in
responsibilities illustrate the limitations on the SDF as well as
the asymmetries of the alliance.
Due to the benefits of possessing the bases, plus the fact
that a war against the United States in which U.S. forces in
Japan were not attacked seemed highly implausible, the
disparities in the obligations of the two parties had no
practical significance during the cold war. On the other hand,
the value of these bases now, with no clear and immediate danger
to U.S. security in the region, is increasingly being challenged
by observers in the region, including many in Japan,43 and in the
United States. The recent willingness of Japanese to respond to
U.S. entreaties for greater "burden sharing" is no doubt at least
partly in recognition of this reality, and an effort to make the
deployment of forces in Japan as painless as possible for the
United States. Despite growing economic problems and increasing
pressures on its own budget,44 Japan makes a larger financial
contribution for the maintenance of U.S. forces than any other
U.S. ally. All yen costs, including the salaries of local
employees, will be borne by Japan in and after FY1995,45 which
will make maintaining military units in Japan considerably less
expensive than maintaining them in the United States. The 20
percent of the SDF's weapons and equipment not produced in Japan
is purchased from the United States, sometimes as much to support
the alliance or help reduce the U.S. trade deficit with Japan as
to meet military requirements, a fact that Japanese
industrialists understand but sometimes resent.46
Adhering to the two fundamental principles (maintenance of a
defense capability and alliance with the United States) and the
constitutional restrictions of Article 9 as interpreted by a
succession of governments, Japan has woven a defense policy
which, as far as its language is concerned, may be described as
defensive and completely nonthreatening. The analysis must now
proceed to an examination of how that policy has been implemented
in structuring and equipping its military establishment, the
Japan Self-Defense Forces.
The Japan Self-Defense Forces.

At the urging of the United States, the Japan Defense Agency
and Self-Defense Forces were created on July 1, 1954, a little
more than 2 years after the formal end of the Allied--mostly
American--occupation, and almost 10 years after--the Imperial
Army and Navy were abolished.47 Evolving hesitantly in the 1950s
and 1960s, before the dramatic economic growth which transformed
Japan into an industrial and technological giant, the components
of the SDF--the Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF), Air
Self-Defense Force (ASDF), and the Maritime Self-Defense Force
(MSDF)--began to take the form of modern, sophisticated military
organizations during the 1970s, and have been marginally improved
during every year since. Highlights in their development have
been the adoption of the NDPO in 1976, the sequence of 5-year
military buildup plans (Mid-term Defense Program Estimates until
1985 and Mid-term Defense Program Plans thereafter) designed to
systematically achieve the goals of the NDPO,48 the Guidelines
for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation adopted in 1978, and the
extensive program of U.S.-Japanese combined exercises which also
began, modestly at first, in 1978.
At present, the SDF are well-equipped, moderately sized
organizations of competent personnel. As is frequently pointed
out, they deploy more of some weapons systems than the U.S.
Seventh Fleet or the U.S. Pacific Air Force.49 It is less
frequently noted that the SDF have far fewer of other weapons
systems than do U.S. forces in the region. Japan also appears to
have a very large defense budget.
Focusing on Japan's defense budgets as a measure of Japan's
military capability is deceptive, however. It is true that the
defense budget is large--4.6 trillion yen for FY1993--and that it
has increased regularly and consistently over a long time. The
rate of increase from 1975 to 1991 averaged 8.6 percent (and was
never below 5.2 percent),50 almost certainly the record for a
nation not at war. It dropped to 3.8 percent51 and 1.9 percent
(the lowest rate of increase since 1960)52 for FY1992 and FY1993
respectively, years when most nations outside of Asia, like the
United States, were reducing their defense budgets significantly.
The increase for FY1994 was only 0.9 percent. However, while this
record may illustrate government priorities, it does not
necessarily realistically indicate anything about Japan's
military capability. Three factors--volatile exchange rates, high
personnel costs, and high equipment costs--distort defense
spending as a standard of military capability for Japan.
International comparisons are always distorted because of
exchange rate fluctuations. The appreciation of the yen--but not
of other major currencies to anything like the same degree-against the dollar (always the currency used for comparisons)
makes this phenomenon especially significant.
Table 1 demonstrates the distortions in comparing 1991
defense budgets among the United States, Russia, the United

Kingdom, Germany, France, and Japan with different rates of
exchange. In column A, 1985 prices and exchange rates are used.
Column B compares the same local currency amounts but converts
them into dollars at 1991 rates of exchange. Germany has a higher
ranking in Column B because the Deutsche mark appreciated
significantly between 1985 and 1991. If October 1993 rates of
exchange (arbitrarily chosen to illustrate this point) are
applied, exactly the same local currency amounts result in the
figures shown in Column C, making Japan appear to have the second
largest military budget because of the appreciation of the yen
and the almost total collapse of the Russian ruble, which was set
at 1.7 per dollar for Column B and an astounding 1193 per dollar
for Column C. Any conclusions about either nation's defense
capability on the basis of the comparison is totally unjustified.
Unless exchange rates are stable over extended periods of time,
international comparisons in a single currency may conceal as
much information as they convey.
(Billions of Dollars)
Exchange rates*
United States
Russia
United Kingdom
France
Japan
Germany

A
1985+
227.1
91.6
22.4
18.0
16.5
16.5

B
1991

C
1993

303.6
238.0
42.2
34.5
32.7
40.0

303.6
0.1
36.3
33.3
40.6
32.2

*1985 and 1991 are average rates as they appear in Military
Balance: 1992-1993, pp. 220-221. 1993 rates are those of
October 22, 1993, as reported in the The New York Times, October
23, 1993, p. D15.
+

Totals are expressed in 1985 prices.
Table 1.
1991 Defense Budgets of Major Nations.

A second reason for discounting comparisons of Japan's
defense budget with other nations is that Japan spends an
unusually large portion of its budget on personnel costs. Between
1983 and 1991, 40.1 to 45.1 percent of Japan's defense budget was
spent on military personnel and provisions,53 even though the
total strength of the SDF was less then 250,000 throughout the
period. During the same time, the United States allocated 23 to
27.1 percent of its defense budget to personnel.54 The Soviet
Union, with a conscripted military force, budgeted only 26.1 to
32.1 percent for personnel and operations and maintenance for

1989, 1990, and 1991.55 The JDA, therefore, has a relatively
smaller proportion of funds appropriated to spend on research and
development, procurement of equipment and weapons systems, and
training, than most other developed nations. In fact, Japanese
authorities have decided to maintain equipment acquisition funds
at 25 to 28 percent,56 approximately the same levels as the
United States.57 They have neglected research and development and
operations and maintenance, including consumable supplies, in
order to maintain their procurement program. This factor should
be especially salient for observers in East Asian states with
much lower personnel costs, when they compare Japanese defense
costs with their own.
Finally, total defense budgets or total defense expenditures
tend to present a distorted picture of Japan's military
capability because much of what Japan purchases for military
purposes is extremely expensive due to the high costs of
production in Japan.58 For reasons only partly related to
defense, the JDA (like most national procurement authorities) has
consciously favored Japanese producers--the NDPO apparently
requires it59--so that 80 percent of all weapons and equipment
are domestically produced.60 Since the export of military
equipment and weapons systems is forbidden, Japanese defense
industries must limit their production lines to JDA demand only,
which normally leads to two to three times higher prices than
that of foreign, including U.S., producers.61 As a result, the
costs which Japan pays for weapons per unit are probably as high
or higher than comparable expenses by any other major nation.
A more meaningful way of evaluating the SDF is to describe
their capabilities and compare them to the armed forces of other
nations, especially those in Northeast Asia, and to the
self-imposed restrictions which Japan purports to follow. Table 2
summarizes a comparison of the GSDF, MSDF, and ASDF to the 15
largest armies, navies, and air forces as of 1991-92. The GSDF is
much smaller in terms of number of personnel than any of the top
15, which include all of the other armies of Northeast Asia,
India, and Pakistan. In Southeast Asia, the Burmese, Indonesian,
and Thai armies62 (also not among the 15 largest), are also
larger than the GSDF. The ASDF had somewhat fewer combat aircraft
than any of the 15 largest, which included the air forces of
China, India, and North Korea. The air force of Taiwan, with 486
aircraft,63 was also larger than Japan's. The South Korean air
force, with 415 combat aircraft,64 was the only one in Northeast
Asia smaller than the ASDF. The MSDF was the 6th largest navy in
terms of tonnage, and, among the top 15 in tonnage, ranked 12th
in number of ships. In Asia, only the Chinese navy had greater
tonnage, and only China, Taiwan, and India had a larger number of
ships. While clearly rudimentary, this comparison suggests that
Japan is not a particularly significant military power, even
regionally, except perhaps in terms of its naval capabilities.
Table 3 summarizes a comparison of selected weapons systems held
by Northeast Asian countries, showing Japan behind all of its

neighbors except in surface combatants. Like the information in Table
2, this data only reflects quantities, and therefore does not
necessarily reflect capabilities. Nonetheless, Table 3 alone clearly
does not suggest that the SDF represent a military threat to any of
Japan's neighbors.

Ground Forces
Name of
country

(10,000
persons)

China
FSU
India
DPRK
Vietnam
USA
ROK
Pakistn
Turkey
Iraq
Germany
Taiwan
Iran
Syria
Egypt
Japan

230.0
150.0
110.0
93.0
90.0
69.1
55.0
50.0
47.0
35.0
33.5
31.2
30.5
30.0
29.0
15.1

Naval Forces
Name of
Country
FSU
USA
China
UK
France
India
Taiwan
Peru
Germany
Turkey
Italy
Canada
Brazil
Indnesia
Spain
Japan

(10,000
tons)

Air Forces

687.4
590.5
98.3
88.9
46.3
24.6
23.0
22.3
21.0
20.0
17.5
14.1
13.8
13.2
12.5
31.9

(Number of Name of
vessels) Country
2,460
1,130
1,910
410
230
450
660
50
260
240
200
70
110
130
230
160

FSU
China
USA
France
DPRK
Germany
India
Syria
Israel
UK
Turkey
Poland
Italy
Egypt
Yugslvia
Japan

(Number
of planes)
7,820
6,140
5,280
900
800
760
690
650
620
600
550
510
500
490
490
460

Adapted from Defense of Japan 1992, Reference 3, p. 209.
Table 2.
Outline of Major and Regional Countries' Military Power.

Weapons System

China

DPRK

ROK

Taiwan

Japan

Main Battle Tank
Armored Personnel Carrier
Artillery Pieces
Multiple Rocket Launchers
Attack Helicopters

7500
2800
NA
3800
62

3000
4000
4500
2400
50

1800
1550
500
140
135

459
990
610
NA
NA

1210
768
859
120
64

Reconnaissance aircraft
Fighter, Ground Attack
Fighters
Bombers

290
600
4600
630

NA
310
401
3

28
206
132
-

38
392
NA
-

81
73
207
-

46
17
37
130
350
56
370

26
3
23
191

4
9
59
10
273
14
36

4
24
10
13
12
26
168

13
6
58
42
105
6
40

Submarines
Destroyers
Frigates
Mine Countermeasures
ASW Helicopters
Amphibious Ship
Amphibious Craft
Source:

Military Balance:

1992-1993.

Table 3.
Selected Weapons Systems in Northeast Asia.

A thorough comparison of weapons systems is beyond the scope of
this study and the expertise of the author. Nonetheless, it may be
noted that the latest generation of equipment and weapons systems
which Japan has fielded, especially for the MSDF and ASDF, are
state-of-the-art or near state-of-the-art. However, the same also may
be said of the armed forces of other Northeast Asian military forces,
especially the PLA and the ROK armed forces. In other words, the SDF's
newest equipment is as good as--in some cases probably better than-any deployed by any other Northeast Asian country. On the other hand,
like the other military organizations, most SDF equipment and weapons
systems are still second generation or older, and not
state-of-the-art. JDA plans to modernize the SDF have been
significantly slowed because of relatively austere defense budgets in
recent years--probably more so than in neighboring countries. The
modernization program probably will continue only at the current, or
even a slower, pace. Thus, any advantage over the forces of other
Northeast Asian countries which the SDF may enjoy in quality because
of superior technology may not be very large.
In addition, the SDF has persistent problems. The underfunding of
logistics has produced a force with very limited sustainability-ammunition stores may be sufficient for a concerted defense of no more
than a week, and few troops are able to practice with live ammunition
once a year.65 Many observers agree with Michael W. Chinworth in
wondering if the purpose of the SDF is really to assuage U.S. pressure
rather than to provide for defense, or any other military purpose.66
Constraints on the defense budget in the last several years have
probably caused even smaller allocations to logistics and operations
than in the past. Some 80 percent of recent budgets have been
committed to nondiscretionary or already obligated funds for personnel
costs, deferred payments for equipment ordered in previous years,67
and support of U.S. forces stationed in Japan, expenses which have
increased more rapidly than the overall budget. Expenses for
ammunition and other logistics items are among the relatively small
portion of total expenses which JDA is able to reduce. Training areas
for the GSDF are extremely limited, which would make effective
training difficult even if adequate funds were available. Complaints
of loud noises hinder the ASDF, just as they do U.S. Air Force and
U.S. naval aviation units stationed in Japan.
The lack of a joint command structure also reduces the capability
of the SDF. As U.S. experience in the Persian Gulf verified,
synchronization of land, sea, and air power is required to obtain the
maximum advantage of military force. The absence of adequate joint
command and control in the SDF, which may assure civilian control,
also reduces combat effectiveness, even in the conduct of purely
defensive strategies. The SDF also lack an adequate reserve system, a
particularly dangerous vulnerability as the size of the services,
especially the GSDF, is reduced due to budget pressure and demographic
changes. Currently, there are less than 48,000 personnel in the
reserves, most GSDF,68 who receive very limited training and are very
poorly compensated.69 Moreover, in a society where the military are
held in low esteem, recruitment for the reserve will be unusually
difficult. The JDA is studying the problem, but no solutions have been

proposed. Lastly, the SDF has absolutely no combat experience.
Whether or not Japan's military organization represents an
"exclusively defensive" force is subject to interpretation, but the
SDF must be as close to that standard as the military of any major
nation. Almost any weapons system may be used for offensive or
defensive purposes, depending on the intent of the user more than the
characteristics of the weapons themselves. Yet, as an island nation
with no land borders, Japan cannot engage in offensive military
action--except counteroffensives against invaders, which certainly
should be included in any definition of defense--unless it can project
power relatively great distances. Japan's closest neighbor, the ROK,
the most vulnerable country to a Japanese incursion, is some 250
kilometers away at the narrowest distance across the Korea Strait.
Vladivostok is about 900 kilometers from Sapporo on Hokkaido, and
Shanghai is approximately 1,000 kilometers from Fukuoka on Kyushu.70
To reach any of these areas, except southern Korea, with sufficient
military force to achieve political goals important enough to justify
the use of force would require bombers, long-range fighter aircraft,
in-flight refueling tankers, a large fleet of amphibious vessels,
long-range missiles, aircraft carriers to protect the fleet, etc. In
the case of Korea, a robust land force capable of sustaining itself
against determined opposition would be required. The SDF do not
possess these capabilities, and, except for marginal increases in the
ranges of fighter aircraft and expansion of the sea-lift capacity of
the MSDF, current plans do not provide for their acquisition.71 For
Japan to develop and produce such systems would require at least a
decade, even if a political consensus existed. While Japanese
commercial maritime and aviation carriers could augment SDF lift
capacity, the SDF could not effectively protect them against hostile
fire except in Japanese waters and air space.
Japan's Defense Industry.
Whether Japan can become a military power in the region will
depend in part upon its defense industry.72 Most of the SDF's weapons
systems and equipment have been produced in Japan, as previously
noted, as the result of a policy designed to reduce the nation's
security dependence on foreign suppliers and acquire defense-related
technologies, primarily to exploit for commercial purposes.73
Therefore, a modern defense sector exists which produces a broad range
of items ranging from rifles and trucks to aircraft, naval combatants,
and missiles. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Kawasaki Heavy Industries,
Toshiba Corporation, and other major Japanese industrial concerns are
leading producers of defense-related equipment. Moreover, the Japanese
have developed technologies for commercial use which also have
important military applications. Indeed, this "Japanese model" of
"spin-on" (as opposed to the Pentagon argument that the civilian
economy has benefitted from "spin-off" of military research and
development) has been cited as a promising pattern to be emulated by
the United States and other post-industrial nations which seek to
reduce military procurement costs.74

The defense sector of Japanese industry is important, but its
capacity is limited and it is not at all critical to the national
economy. Defense orders have consistently accounted for only 0.3 to
0.4 percent of total production.75 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries has won
25 percent of defense contracts in the last decade, but defense only
accounted for 15 percent of its total income for the same period. For
most of the top 20 companies doing business with JDA, defense work
accounted for less than 5 percent of total production.76 The only
sectors of industry that depend on JDA are weapons and ammunition,
which have no other client, and aircraft, some 80 percent dependent on
JDA orders.77 The declining increases in defense budgets of the last
few years and possible decreases in the near future78 suggest that
unless the Japanese economy fails to recover in the next few years,
the relative significance of the defense industry as a share of the
economy will decrease. If the JDA relaxes its policy of always giving
priority to Japanese producers, regardless of price, there may be even
greater reductions in funds available to domestic contractors. (In
1993, in "an almost unprecedented" decision which may or may not
represent a new policy, JDA purchased a landing craft with air cushion
from a U.S. supplier because it was less expensive and of higher
quality than the same item, at least acceptable in quality, made in
Japan.)79 Anticipating decreases in orders, a number of companies are
readjusting internal structure to shift resources from defense to
commercial production.80 Whatever defense industrial base which exists
in Japan may atrophy even more as budgets decline in the near term.
Future International Roles for Japan.
Many variables--some of which cannot now even be identified--may
influence future international roles which Japan will adopt. Three
which can be specified are the perceptions held by Japanese opinion
leaders and defense intellectuals about (1) the international system,
(2) likely developments in U.S. policy toward the region and Japan,
and (3) the proper international posture for Japan in the emerging
world order.81 In the context of this study, the first two of these
variables may be stipulated: (1) many Japanese believed that the end
of the cold war introduced a period of dangerous uncertainty into
regional and international politics; and (2) there would be some
degree of disengagement from the region by the United States, the
great nation which acted as Japan's defender for almost five decades,
but which was now preoccupied with domestic concerns.82
The almost simultaneous emergence of these widely held
perceptions called into question the "core axioms that have guided
Japanese foreign policy since 1945," and stimulated a national debate,
still very much in process, comparable to "American `Great Debates'
just prior to World War II, at the outset of the cold war, and during
the Vietnam War."83 The debate has been almost unprecedented for
Japan, where the public discussion of security and defense policy had
been systematically avoided as a taboo by many politicians, or at most
limited to marginal changes in the inventory of the SDF or the percent
of GNP dedicated to defense for decades.84

This foreign policy debate, which was accelerated and broadened
by Japan's need to respond to the Persian Gulf crisis and subsequent
attempts to authorize Japanese participation in U.N. peacekeeping
operations (which in 1992 resulted in the PKO bill discussed above),
had yet to reach a consensus on a new international stance for Japan
in 1993. There seemed to be broad acceptance that some change was
required, but no substantive consensus on the direction that change
should take. One result was new attention toward restructuring Japan's
inadequate and cumbersome foreign affairs bureaucracy, including the
undermanned Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There were no serious
proposals to significantly strengthen the JDA, still the step-child of
Japan's administrative structure.
The evolution of the consensus on security and defense since the
establishment of JDA and SDF, and the great differences of opinion
still remaining, were illustrated by an LDP study group report on
Article 9 which was issued in February 1992. During the parliamentary
wrangles over the PKO bill, its opponents frequently asserted that any
foreign deployment of SDF was prohibited by Article 9 of the
Constitution. LDP proponents of the bill rejected that interpretation,
but some of them also believed that the official interpretation was
overly restrictive. Through the LDP study group report, they
recommended a new interpretation to permit an "active pacifism," a
shift "from a passive stance of mainly enjoying the benefits of a
global system to an active stance of assisting in the building of a
new order." The report also called for a review of the Self-Defense
Forces Law to provide the legal basis for the SDF to take part in
"international security" operations which included, but were not
necessarily limited to, orthodox peacekeeping activities.85 The report
did not support collective defense, although some of its members did.
That elected members of the House of Representatives would take such
positions represented a sea-change in attitudes about defense from,
say, a decade ago. That neither the LDP nor the Miyazawa government
embraced the report, which would have been totally rejected by much of
the opposition, showed that the foundation for a radical departure in
foreign and defense policy did not exist.
The great foreign policy debate has mostly focused on the basic
orientation of Japanese foreign policy: Should Japan foster its
bilateral alliance with the United States in a global partnership, or
concentrate on a regional focus linking Japan with the rest of Asia?
As Eugene Brown has pointed out, these positions are not logically
exclusive, but factions among the policy elites are engaged in a
contest "over which of the two paradigms should lie at the heart of
Japan's nascent effort to construct a coherent foreign policy."86 What
is most significant for this report is that only a small minority of
the minority who favored the emphasis of regionalism over bilateral
ties with the United States in any way implied, much less explicitly
advocated, that Japan should back its policy with deployments of armed
forces except as a part of U.N.-sponsored peacekeeping forces.
Similarly, few of the group which emphasized ties with the United
States as the basis for Japan's geopolitical strategy, which Brown
believes clearly dominated among the policy elites,87 entertained a
military component beyond peacekeeping. Indeed, one of the major

arguments for focusing on bilateral relations with the United States
was that other Asian nations would accept Japan's military capability
only when operated in the context of, and circumscribed by, the
alliance.
The national debate on Japan's proper international roles is not
over, and new rationales supported by new coalitions could emerge. The
elections in July 1993 were a watershed in Japanese politics,88
introducing what many observers believe will be the most significant
period of political change since the end of the Occupation,89
inevitably affecting the foreign policy debate and vice-versa. Indeed,
it has been argued that, despite the fact that corruption and
political reform were the issues which led to the fall of Miyazawa's
cabinet, the present "political upheaval" is primarily a response to
the end of the cold war. The contention is that Japan's prosperity
depends on the international system, and
[t]he ability to grasp the trends of the time and to profit
from this [has become] the mark of an astute politician. The
leaders of this upheaval grasped the meaning for Japan of
the end of the cold war and have pressed for changes in the
domestic system required by the new international
circumstances.90
The probable beginning of a new era of Japanese politics is why the
elections are used as a major division of the analysis.
In any case, most of the young dynamic leaders of the first
non-LDP cabinet,91 such as Prime Minister Hosokawa, Foreign Minister
Hata, and the man who is credited with masterminding the formation of
the diverse coalition, Ichiro Ozawa, are exponents of a more active,
responsible role in international affairs for Japan. The LDP study
group which called for a more active Japanese posture was chaired by
Ozawa, then secretary-general of the LDP but now leader of one of the
break-away parties which are providing the leadership for the movement
for change.92 The process of political change is likely to be slow,
probably taking years to solidify. As it does, a new leadership
attuned to international realities and supported by some of the more
forward looking Japanese interests will not only enrich the foreign
policy debate, but also introduce new approaches and policies on
defense and security. Based on what is known of the positions of these
people now, they probably will support more active diplomacy and a
firm commitment to U.N. collective security, but not a military
capability for unilateral action.93 They may also continue to restrain
defense spending. If their goal is to make Japan what Ozawa calls "a
normal country,"94 it will probably be normal primarily in the sense
that it no longer claims an exception from the normal responsibilities
of a major power, not necessarily in the sense of deploying formidable
military forces.
While determining foreign policy will probably continue to be
primarily the business of the governing elite, including the
bureaucrats at relevant ministries, Japan's future international
posture will also be influenced by public opinion, reflected in

choices made at the polls and pressures applied on elected and other
officials.95 It cannot be said what future public opinion in Japan
will support, but in recent years it definitely has not been
expansionism or aggression. On the other hand, leaders seeking to
guide Japan toward "active pacifism" may be restrained by public
opinion until they can alter the views of many citizens. In 1992, 46
percent of a USIA poll agreed that "Japan should be a pacifist country
and the SDF should be strictly limited to defending Japan," with the
same percentage--not a majority--holding that Japan should take
responsibility for maintaining peace in the world, even if it required
sending SDF troops on peacekeeping duty.96 And what about the SDF? In
a poll sponsored by the Prime Ministers Office in February 1991, only
33.3 percent thought that the SDF should place priority on maintaining
national security, while 15.6 percent choose maintaining civil peace
as the primary mission, and 39.2 percent indicated disaster relief.97
In almost any other nation, most citizens would expect the first
mission of the armed forces would be to defend the nation. In the same
poll only 7.3 percent believed that Japan should go it alone on
defense instead of depend upon the alliance with the United States.98
Some observers of Japan argue that future generations of Japanese
will be less impressed than older Japanese with the horrors of war and
the tragic results of Japan's last flirtation with militarism. Failure
of Japan's education system to realistically present the history of
the Pacific War in the schools supports this position. The argument
continues that future generations will also be less willing than their
elders have been to accept responsibility for the damage which Japan
inflicted on East Asia, especially China and Korea. As they begin to
assume authority in Japan, then, Japan's foreign policy will become
increasingly independent and assertive, and profoundly destabilizing.
However, this argument has not been strengthened by the very strong
apology to Japan's war victims by Prime Minister Hosokawa, the most
prominent representative of the new generation of Japanese
politicians, in his first address to the Diet as Prime Minister.99
On the other hand, a contrary argument holds that the trends of
change in Japanese society are toward more individualism, more concern
for the present, less identification in terms of larger groups, and
less emphasis on tradition. Such cultural and intellectual
developments can mean less support in coming generations for
nationalism than exists at present, and certainly at least as much
avoidance of militarism.100
Summation and Conclusions.
The discussion thus far has considered Japan's security policy,
the SDF, Japan's defense industry, and future international roles for
Japan as currently envisioned by its political elites and defense
intellectuals. The analysis does not support the hypothesis that Japan
and the SDF are likely to become a military threat to Northeast Asia,
or anywhere else, in the near term. Declaratory policy is certainly
not aggressive--few governments ever openly admit aggressive
intentions, but what governments say is important in this information

era--and, more significantly, the SDF does not have the capacity to
project sufficient force to compete with its well-armed neighbors or
sustain a conflict anywhere for more than a few weeks. The SDF are
competent to effectively initiate defensive action, and in the case of
the MSDF are probably best of any regional rival, but they would not
be able to take the battle to mainland Asia or Taiwan. Undoubtedly,
the Japanese economy, in time, could shift resources and restructure
industry to produce whatever equipment and weapons systems were
desired. But time would be required: the Japanese defense industry is
not particularly robust, and it represents a small segment of the
economy.
The movement in the defense consensus from idealistic pacifism
enshrined in Article 9 to present defense policy and SDF was at least
as much a response to U.S. pressures for contributions to the cold war
as the result of internal pressures for security: the buildup in the
SDF is normally described as a series of minimal Japanese responses to
U.S. demands. In the last few years, with the taboo against publicly
discussing the military broken, there are still few voices (and they
represent an ultra-nationalist fringe) seeking a radical break with
the pacifist tradition of the post-war era. The debate on PKO
legislation, which eventually was adopted in watered-down form,
related to Japan assuming responsibility for international stability
and security, not for Japan developing military might to support its
diplomacy. Against the assertions that deploying SDF units abroad
violated Article 9, there were proposals to amend the Constitution.
But the changes advocated by mainstream Japanese politicians and
opinion leaders would not have affected the existing language which
prohibits resort to force as an instrument of policy. Instead, they
would add another paragraph giving explicit Constitutional recognition
of armed forces only for self-defense and participation in
U.N.-mandated collective security activities.
As far as economic and technological capacity is concerned, Japan
clearly could commit more resources to maintaining and expanding its
military. More than 1 percent of GNP could go to defense, a much
larger share of its industry could be dedicated to weapons systems and
military equipment, and with difficulty tens of thousands more
possibly could be enticed or ordered into uniform.101 However, this
implies the political capacity to fashion and adopt a new security
policy, which is not at all self-evident.
If the 1993 elections in Japan did not unleash new political
forces--if the rules of the old system are to continue to apply for
the foreseeable future--then the likelihood of a new consensus behind
radical policy departures is extremely low. As in the past, defense
decisions will be designed to avoid or minimize domestic political
conflict with little or no attention to substantive positions. The
politics of defense in Japan will continue to mean the management of
external and internal pressures, and only marginal adjustments in
policy will be adopted.
On the other hand, if a period of fundamental political change is
underway, departures from past practices in every arena, including

defense, are possible. The current consensus on government policies-even the requirement that important policies proceed on the basis of
consensus--could be radically reshaped as new forces, new styles, and
new ideas permeate Japanese politics. If it is true that the real
motivations for the present political upheaval are the requirements
for Japan to conform to the expectations of the transformed
international system, then changes in security policy and defense
posture are more likely than in many other policy areas.
But there is no evidence that the politicians pressing for
political reform--the young, dynamic former Liberal Democrats who were
frustrated by the old system--advocate militarily expansive policy at
all. Most of them would like to see Japan more active in regional and
international affairs by serving permanently on the Security Council,
by participating in selected U.N. peacekeeping operations, by taking a
leading role in regional security fora, and perhaps in creating new
regional security frameworks. They will want to preserve Japan's
alliance with the United States, and they probably will want to keep
defense spending low. All this conforms with existing Japanese policy.
At least until political reform has taken root throughout Japanese
government, which may take many years, the most noticeable changes in
Japan's security will be in style and timing. The least noticeable,
because very little will be taking place, will be in the strategic
posture of the SDF.
Implications for the United States and Japan's Neighbors.
Regardless of the qualities of the SDF, if Japan is viewed as a
regional danger because of its military strength the stability of Asia
is threatened. The United States seeks stability in its own right,
because stability is a prerequisite for the pursuit of trade and
investment opportunities, the expansion of human rights, and most
other regional objectives. More specifically, Washington does not want
Seoul to divert any of its defense resources to deal with a Japanese
"threat" instead of focusing single-mindedly on the danger from the
North, which accounts for 37,000 American troops on the peninsula.
Japan's neighbors also value stability, if not necessarily for the
same reasons. The logic of this analysis to the contrary
notwithstanding, they are all, unfortunately, in various degrees
concerned about the potential of Japan as a military threat.
To moderate the destabilizing consequences of perceptions that
Japan is a military threat, at least four courses of action can be
taken by the United States. It would be highly desirable if Japan's
neighbors assumed the leadership in two of them.
• The United States must maintain its alliance with Japan and
remain militarily engaged in Northeast Asia to foster the conditions
which would permit regional governments to view the SDF as
nonthreatening military organizations. Since fears of U.S.
disengagement seems to generate perceptions of a Japanese military
threat, credible actions which show that the fears are unfounded are
obvious first steps for the United States to take to weaken these

perceptions. I argue at the beginning of this report that, in fact,
the United States is not disengaging in any significant sense, and
that its leaders repeatedly indicate that it will remain engaged for
the foreseeable future. As far as undermining beliefs that the United
States is disengaging from the region, the United States needs only to
continue the present course, articulate policy as forcefully as
possible, and wait for the statesmen of Asia to recognize reality.
• The United States should continue to be very careful and
discrete about influencing the expansion and modernization programs of
the SDF. Asian leaders tend to believe, with good reason, that the
Japanese made improvements in the SDF in response to U.S. pressure.
While they were unhappy about these U.S. demands, they could at least
understand them in the context of the cold war. U.S. calls for Japan
to assume military roles in Northeast Asia in the current
international environment will be less palatable, and far more
difficult to understand. That is not to say that the U.S. Government
should not be at all concerned with Japan's military participation in
the alliance. For example, it is appropriate for U.S. officials to
publicly discuss co-development or co-deployment of theater missile
defense systems with their Japanese counterparts; the weapons system
involved is defensive, and the project is related to the security
concerns of both nations. Suggestions that Japan increase spending for
military purposes generally, or procure weapons with offensive
potential against China, Russia, or Korea, would be bad policy and
worse politics.
• The United States should continue to foster--better if the
initiative came from the region--military-to-military cooperation and
openness among the armed forces of Northeast Asia. It is not
necessarily true that increased information always leads to increased
understanding, but in the case of the SDF and their counterparts in
other nations of the region, greater interaction and transparency
probably will lead to more understanding of each others' policies,
capabilities, and limitations. If this analysis is correct and the SDF
are not a threat to their neighbors, such a program should result in
more secure relationships among Asian countries.
• Finally, the United States should support regional security
arrangements, hopefully developed by Northeast Asian governments, in
which Japanese military powers can be legitimized and circumscribed.
The nations of Asia will feel more secure about Japan having any level
of military capability if it is woven into security arrangements in
which all participate and in which all have some means of influencing
what the others do. Exactly what form they should take is unclear. I
have argued in another place that regional security arrangements in
Asia should evolve from local initiatives, and probably should be
limited in terms of participants or function so that they are related
to real needs of the members.102 Other analysts have arrived at similar
conclusions.103 From the U.S. perspective, such security arrangements
would deserve support and participation because some of them,
depending on their structure, might also encompass China, another
potential challenger to stability in the region.
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